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[L. A. No. 21238. In Bank. Oct. 18. 1950.1

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA JOCKEY CLUB, INC. (a Cor·
poration), Appellant, v. CALIFORNIA HORSE RACING BOARD et aI., Respondents.
(1] Theaters and Exhibitions - Licenses - Horse Racing. - The
words "shall be within the power of the bonrd" contained in
the 1933 Horse Racing Act (Stats. 1933, p. 1127) are no more
or less mandatory or permissive than the word "may" in Bus.
& Prof. Code, § 19480.
[2] Statutes-Oonstruction of Oodes-Reenacted ProVisions.-The
codification of the horse racing law (placing it in the Business
and Professions Code) was presumably not intended as a
change in the law.
[3] Theaters and Exhibitions - Licenses - Horse Racing. - The
licensing provisions of the hOrse racing law (Bus. & Prof.
Code, § 19480 et seq.) are valid and not open to the objection
that they constitute an unlawful delegation of legIslative
power to the Horse Racing Board without adequllte standards.
14] Administrative Law-Oourt Review-Hearing.-On petition
. to the superior court for a writ of mandate to compel the
Horse Racing Boa.d to issue a horse racing lieense;-tIlat-eourf-should not reweigh the evidence, and its sole function is to
determine from a review of the record, whether there is sufficient evidence to sustain the ruling of the board.
[6] Theaters and ~xhibitions-Licenses- Horse Racing -Endence.-On the hearing before the Horse Racing Board of an
application for a license to conduct horre raeing, the admission
of evidence that other race tracks in the county would suffer
an "economic detriment" were the license granted, if improper,
is of no consequence where without such evidence there is
sufficient evidence to support the board's decision refusing the
license.
[6] Appeal-Presumptions-Disregard of Incompetent Evidence.
-It is presumed on appeal that the trial court, sitting without
a jury, did not base its finding on incompetent evidence where
there is competent evidence to support it.
[3] See 10 Oal.Jur. lO-Yr.Supp. (1947 Rev.) (1949 Pocket Part)
96; 42 Am.Jur. 334.
McK. Dig. References: [1,3] Theaters and Exhibitions, § 3;
[2] Statutes, § 197; [4,8) Administrative Law, § 22; [5,9,11-14]
Theaters and Exhibitions, § 6: {6] Appeal and Error, 11138;
[7,10] Administrative Law, § 25.
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(7). AdmtDlstrative Law-Oourt BeTiew-AppeaL-Where
is competent evidence to support the judgment of the
on review of a decision of an administrative board
improper evidence admitted before tbe board, it is Dot
portantthat offer of proof in- rebuttal of sucb IncompeCeJI
evidence was denied by the board.
(8] ld.-Court BeTiew-BeariDg.-ProeeedingB on review of
decision of an administrative board are considered
a hearing where .the record before the board is ~IUWiue'\l-~~
the purpose of determining the sumeiency of the
rather than a trial de novo. and so the admission of inele'v.Jllt<::!
or incompetent evidence by the board is not gr01lDd to
its aellon if there is sufficient competent evidence to 8U1)pGI~l
itll deterwination.
[9] Theaters and Exhibitions - Licenses -Bone Racingdence.-There was sufficient evidence to justify the denial
a license to conduct borse racing where tbe evidence .....'".U".".i,:<!
that transportation facilities anu trat'lic conditions would ,
adversely affected by the track, that added tire pl'9teetioD
would be necessary, that the track would reduce the staDdard·
of the racing and breeding industry in the state, that it
curtail the revenue to the state, and that it would be iDj'I1riII>~~
to nonprofit fairs and hence to agriculture.
(10] Administrative .loaw - Oourt Renew - Appeal.-on .m_~
------- .- frow·-il-judgment upholding the decision of an adlrniIlistrativelj
body, the credibilit) of witnesses before that body and
weight of· the evidenee cannot be considered.
[111 Theaters and Exhibitions-Licenses-Borse Racing-Burd8D '
of Proof.-An applicant for a· license to conduct horse racing·
has the burden of proving, at least, that public interest and.,
the purposes of the horse racing law would Dot be detrimentally affected by the proposed new track.
[12] Id.-Licenses-Borse Racing.-On application to the Horse
Racing Board for a license to conduct horse races it is for the .
board to determine whether applicant's evidence meets the burden of showing that public iDterest and the purposes of the •
Horse Racing Act would not be detrimentally affected by the .
proposed track, and this is especially true where most of the
evidence consists of opinions and the issues involved are geDera! and iDcapable of exact definition.
(IS] Id.-Licenses-Bone Racing-8tandard.-There is no basis
for the cODtention that in denying a license for the conduct
of horse races the standard established by Bus. & Prof. Code,
§ 19480.5, was Dot applied where the finding of the board was
in the language of _the statute.
[14] Id.-Licenses-E:orse Racing.-A claim that the Horse Itaoing Board in pasbil16 Ilpoll &l1 application for a horse raci.DI
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license acted irregularly in reaching its decision in that . .e
of the members of the board telephoned his yote was without
merit where the matter was subsequently decided by a majorit,'
of the board.

Proceeding in mandamus to compel Horse Racing Board to
issue a license. JUdgment denying relief aftirmed.
Athearn, Chandler & Farmer, Hoffman & Angell, F. G.
Athearn and Leigh Athearn for Appellant.
Fred N. Howser, Attorney General, Kenneth E. Lynch,
Assistant Attorney General, and Howard S. Goldin, Deputy
Attorney General, for Respondents.
Gerald H. Hagar, J. D. Strauss, and Joseph W. Paulucci,
Amici Curiae on behalf of Respondents.
CARTER, J .-Proceeding under section 19480.5 of the I
Business and Professions Code, plaintiff applied to the Cali-·
!ol'llia Horse Racing Board for a determination that the purposes of the horse racing law (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 19420'
et seq.) and public interest would be served by the construction by it of a traf!k for horse race meetings at Puente, Los
Angeles County, California. The application was denied,
and plaintiff thereupon presented a petition for a writ of mandate to the superior court to compel the board to issue a
license to it for such purpose, and that court agreed with the
board. Plaintiff now asserts that the licensing provisions of
tbe horse racing law are invalid in that they constitute an
unlawful delegation of legislative power to the board without
adequate standards (Cal. Const., arts. III and IV, § 1) ; that
improper evidence was admitted before the board; that the
('vidence was insufiicient to sustain its determination or that
of tIle superior court; and that the board acted irregularly.
Section 19480.5 under whieh plaintiff made its application
provides: "The board shall not issue a license to conduct
a horse racing meeting at any place, inclosure, or track, not
used for horse racing meetings prior to July I, 1941, unless
prior to the beginning of the construction or preparation of
such place, inclosure, or track for horse racing meetings, the
board, upon application in such form as it may require, has
determined that conducting horse racing meetings at such
place will be in tke public interest and will BUbserv6 tke pur-
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poses of thIs chapter." I Emphasis added.} This section
added to the borsE' racin~ law in 1941 (8tats. 1941, ch. 1
§ 3, p. 3129). It is not questioned that that section lays
adequate standard!' to govern the action of the board.
plaintiff challenges thf' broad provision contained in the
<,eding section. which provision reads: "The board may issue
to any person who makes application therefor in writing,
who has complied with the provisions of this ehaptf'r and who.
makes the deposit to secure pa~'ment of the Ih'ense fpe reql1ire,lt.'
by this article a license to conduct a hoTSf' racing meeting ht.:
accordance with this rhapter at the placf', inclosure or track
specified in the appliration." (Bus. & Prof. Code. & 19480:)
The horse racing board is in a different category than other
administrative or executive agencie!;: with respect to thf' dE'legation of legislative power to it. A borse racing act W88 '
passed by the Legislature in 1933 (Stats. 1933, pp. 1127,.
2046). wherein it was provided that it should be effective
"upon the adoption of a constitutional amendment' ratifying
its provisions." (Id., § 19.) In June, 1933, a constitutional .
amendment was adopted which provides: "The Legislature
may provide for the regulation of horse races and horse race'
meetings and wagering on the results thereof. The provisions ;
of an act entitled •An act to provide for the regulation andl
licensing of horse racing, horse race meetings, and the wage~;~
ing on the results thereof; to create the California Horse Rae:
ing Board for the regulation, licensing and superVISIon of 1
said horse racing and wagering thereon; to provide penalties
for the violation of the provisions of this act, and to provide
that this act shall take effect upon the adoption of a constitutional amendment ratifying its provisions,' are h.ereby con- I
firmed, ratified, and declared to be fully and completely effec- j
tive; provided, that said act may at any time be amended or I
repealed by the Legislature." [Emphasis added.] (Cal. I
Const., art. IV, § 25a.) In Sandstrom v. California Horse Racing Board, 31 Ca1.2d 40] f]89 P.2d 17, 3 A.L.R.2d 90], this
court considered the power of the board to revoke or suspend,
the license of a horse trainE'r licensed under the horse racing
law. In that case petitioner'R license. had been suspended for
a violation of a rule adopted by the board, and one of the.
contentions of petitionE'r was that "insofar as that rule is
ba!;ed on the statutory grant of power to the board to pre-:
scrihf' rules. rp~llIRtion!'l linn romHtions under which horse
racing is conducted .•. it is an unconstitutional delegatioD
.1
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of legislative authority." In an::;wt::r to that contention, this.
rour!. after reciting the adoption of the 1933 act and constitutillllnl amrlldment, stated: "The effect of this constitutional
81l11'11Ilm('nt as bere material is that it expressly 'confirmed,
flltiONl, nnd declared to be fully and completely effective' the
1"""lath'( grant of power to the California Horse Ractng
I1l/1ml. That the Constitution may permit the Legislature to
(J,·II'I-(ate powers may not be doubted. The Constitution may
1'\'1'11 nut horize the Legislature to confer additional powers
\l'hi('h are cognate and germane to its purposes upon a constitutional board or commission, and may further provide that
KIH'h powers are unlimited by any other provisions of the ConRlitlltion. (See Const .• art. XII, § 22; Pacific Telephone etc.
(~(J v. Rshleman, 166 Cal. 640 [137 P. 1119. Ann.Cas. 19]5C
~:!2. 1)0 L.R.A.N.S. 652).)
Thr continuance of the grant of
po\\'C'r into section 19561. Business and Professions Code. did
IIot nlTrct its status as previously ratified and confirmed. (See
Blls. & Prof. Code, § 2.) The delegation of authority here
('()Ilsidered has constitutional support. to {Emphasis added. I
'1'hat ('ase is controlling herE' on the subjE'et of delegation of
1C'l!islative power. for there is no rational difference betw('en
tlw <il·legation there of rule making power, and that pres('ntrd
hl'rl', that is, that insufficient standards were fixed by the
''''':rislatnre as the basis upon which the board could grant
or dl'ny a license.
Plllintiff argues, however, that the 1933 statute did not give
I\lIc'h broad power~ to the board as are given by the presE'l1t
pro\'lsions of the Business and Professions Code. With that
\W cannot agree. Thr 1933 act, like the present one, prohibits
thp conduct of horse race meeting'S where wagering is pE'rmitted without obtaining a Iicen~e. (Stats. 1933, p. 1127,
§ 1 : Bus. & Prof. Code. § 19560.) There is separate provision
for licensing owners, riders, trainE'rs, etc. (as distingnislJE'd
from track operators or conductors of meetings) and s1Ich
JicpnsE's "shaH be subject to revocation and no person shall
bp ('ligible to, or permitted to participate in such racing unlrss
so licl'nsed, and only during the time such license re,mains
I1nrevoked. No qualified person shan be refused such license,
nor shall such license be revoked without just cause." (Stats.
1933, p. 1127, § 3. second para~aph.) Thus. those provisions
are not here applicable as we are /lealing with licenses for
rap(' meE'tin~ and places of meptings. It is next proviilpd
with regard to a license of the character here involved, that:

I
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"Upon the award to any applicant and upon payment of the
license fees as hereinafter prescribed, the board shall i'l8ue.:
a license which shall permit the licensee, during the dates
awarded to such ~pplicant and for which license fees shaU.
have been paid, to conduct at its track a race meeting, or'
meetings, and wagering on the results thereof, as herein pro.' ,
Wled.
"All licenses provided to be granted under the provisions"
of this act, including those granted pursuant to the provisioD8 ,
of section 3 hereof, shan be subject to all rules, regnlations'
and conditions from time to time prescribed by the board ,
and shall contain such conditions as shall be deemed by said
board necessary or desirable for the purposes of this act.
"Such license shall be subject to suspension or revocation
by the board in any case where the board shall have reason
to believe that any condition of its license has not been complied with or any law or any rule or regulation of such board, _
shall have been broken or violated..•• " [Emphasis ad~d.] i
(Stats, 1933, p. 1127, § 9.) Plainly, the first paragraph above:
quoted refers to the mere mechanical issuance of the license "
certificate alter the award has been made, that is, after there '
has been a determination, that the applicant, ~ entitled, ~ a .
license. Naturally such terms are mandatory for nothing is ,
left to do following such a finding except the ministerial act \
of issuing the license. Moreover, the words "as herein pro:. .'
vided" refer to an "award" as provided in the act. Hence.
that Section (9) does not apply to the situation here involved
which concerns the making of a determination or an award "
that an applicant should or should not have a license. This is '~
further demonstrated when we turn to section 11 of the 1933:
act which contains provisions similar to section 19480 of the
Business & Professions Code, I1tpra, and here pertinent. Section 11 reads: "Upon the filing of an application, in writing, .
for a license, as herein provided, if the same should be in '
accordance with this act, and upon the payment of the license~
, fee hereinafter provided for, it shall be toithin the power 01"1
the board to issue a license to the applicant to conduct a horse "1
race meeting in accordance with the provisions of the act at
the place, enclosure or track specified in the application; and :
in counties of the first and second clesses, as hereiriabove de-I
fined, no license shall be granted to conduct a horse race meet- '
ing upon a track less than one mile in circumference and/or
length. except that the board may in its discretion grant licenses to county fairs and to rodeos to conduct horse race
4
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meetings upon tracks less than one mile in circumference
and/or length, in counties of the third class licenses may be
granted in the discretion of the board to conduct race meetings
on tracks of less than a mile in circumference and/or length."
[Emphasis added.] (Stats. 1933, p. 1127, § 11.) [1] There
i!! just as much a lack of standard for issuance of a license
in the foregoing provision of the 1933 act as there is in section
l!l480 of the Business and Professions Code, and the word!!
"shall be within the power of the board" contained in the
19:-13 act are no more or less mandatory or permissive than
the word "may" in section 19480 of the Business and Profl'ssions Code. The two expressions mean substantially the
same thing. For illustration, it is said that "may" means
"to have power" (National Automobile etc. Co. v. Garrison,
76 CaLApp.2d 415 [173 P.2d 67]; Robison v. Payne, 20 Cal.
App.2d 103 [66 P.2d 710]), and "may" may be either mandatory or permissive depending upon the circumstances. (See
Robison v. Payne, supra; California Trust Co. v. Bennett' r
33 Cal.2d 694 [204 P.2d 324] ; Carter v. Seaboard Finance)
Co., 33 Ca1.2d 564 [203 P.2d 7581; Hollman v. Warren, 32
Ca1.2d 351 [196 P.2d 562J ; Department of Social Welfare v.
Kern C6unty,.29.ca1.2d 873 !l80 P.2d 1] ; Housing Authority
v. Superior Court, 18 CR1.2d 336 [115 P.2d 468].} [2] Moreover, it must be remembered that the codification of the horse
rncinrr law (placing it in the Business and Professions Code)
was presumably not intended as a change in the law. (Bus. &
Prof. Code, § 2; Sandstrom v. California Horse Racing Board,
supra.) [3] We conclude, therefore, that section 19480 of
the Business and Professions Code made no substantial change I
in the 1933 statute on the subject here involved, and since !
the 1933 act was confirmed and ratified by the constitutional
RlIIC'ndment. the attack made on its validity cannot stand.
(Sandstrom v. California Horse Racing Board, supra.)
The board found, pursuant to section 19480.5 of the Busi-l
ness and Professions Code, that applicant (plaintiff) had I
failed to show that the conduct of horse race meetings at!
Puente would be in the public interest and subserve the pur-I
pose of the horse racing law. The trial court decided the case!
upon the record made before the board and found that its!
finding was supported by "substantial evidence." Plaintiff!
challenges these f i n d i n g s . .
Plaintiff asserts that the trial court did not weigh the
evidence; that, therefore, this court must weigh the evidencd
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and Moran v. Board of Medical Examiners, 32 Cal.2d 8o{i
[196 P.2d 20], is not controlling. There are two answers to'")
that contention. First, it clearly appears from the 1indinp~
that the court did weigh the evidence, although the memoran:~
dum opinion of the trial judge might point to the contrary:J'
The findings control. There is no distinction between this "',
ease and Moran v. Board of Med~cal Examiners, 32 Cal.2d;
301 [196 P.2d 201. where it was held that the appellate co~::
would not reweigh the evidence in reviewing the findings of'
a trial court on a determination by a statewide administrative:
agency; and that such findings would be given all the bene- :
fits accorded them in other proceedings. Second, even if it.j
be assumed that the trial court did not reweigh the evidence. j
it should not have done so in a case such as this, where it was _:
reviewing the denial of an application for a license for a business whose regulation is a proper subject of the police power , _
as distinguished from the revocation or suspension of a license. -;
This rule was announced in McDonough v. Goodcell, "1'3 Cal. :
2d 741 [91 P.2d 1035, 123 A.L.R. 1205j, where this court ~
said: "The legislature has the power to vest in a public·~
officer the discretion to deny an application for a permit to ,'.
engage in a business subject to regulation when prerequisite .
facts do not exist. But such a discretion must be exercised
within legal bounds. Those bounds are generally that the ,
discretion of the administrative officer or board may not hi ~'
exercised arbitrarily, capriciously, fraudulently, or without '~
a factual basis sufficient to justify the refusal. . . . A survey:
of the foregoing authorities discloses that it is the settled _~
g:.:neral rule of law in this state that where the legislature'
has by statute clothed an administrative officer with power
to ascertain the facts with reference to the fitness of an appli- .'
cant for a permit to engage in a business subject to regulation ' '
under the police power and has vested in such officer the discretion, based on the facts ascertained, to grant or deny a
permit to engage in such business the courts will not interfere
with the exercise of such discretion except in the case of an
abuse thereof. There may be modifications of this general
rule under special circumstances not here present; as will
hereinafter be noted.
"The question bere is wbether the commissioner abused his
discretion in denying the permit to the petitioners. Such
abuse of discretion would appear if he acted arbitrarily, capri·
rionsly, or fralldnlently No ('laim can properly be made
that he: acted capriciously or fraudulently. And he acted
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arbitrarily only in the event there was no sufficient factual
basis for his conclusions.
"The testimony before the commissioner was voluminous
and highly conflicting . . .
"Unquestionably the testimony before the commissioner
would sustain a conclusion either way upon the issue of the
good moral character and fitness of the petitioners to engage
in the bail bond business in San Francisco. If the trial had
been before a court the evidence was sufficient to support
findings either way or was sufficient to support a verdict
either way on the issue. With this state of the record our
inquiry on this phase of the case is at an end, for it cannot be
said that there was not a sufficient factual basis for the concl usion of the commissioner and therefore he did not act
arbitrarily or otherwise abuse his discretionary power in
denying the permit." Those views have been consistently
approved. (See Dierssen v. Civil Service Commission, 43
Ca1.App.2d 53, 60 [110 P.2d 513] ; Newport v. Caminetti, 56
Cal.App.2d 557 [132 P.2d 897] ; Wallace v. Board of Education, 63 Cal.App.2d 611 l147 P.2d 8] ; HoU8t'1wn v. Board of
Aledical Examiners, 84 Cal.App.2d 308 [190 P.2d 653];
McDonough v. Garnsort, 68 Ca1.App.2d 318 [156 P.2d 983] ;
Glick v. 8cudder,169 Cal.App.2d 717 [160 P.2d 90].) And
the rule was not changed by statute as· is evident from the
wording of section 10945 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
[4] We therefore hold, that in a case such as this, the trial
court should not reweigh the evidence, and its iole function is,
to determine from a review of the record, whether there is
sufficient evidence to sustain the ruling of the board. If the
trial court should hold the evidence insufficient, and this holding is attacked on appeal, the court to which the appeal is
taken must review the record and determine the sufficiency
of the evidence. If the evidence is found to be sufficient, the
ruling of the board must be sustained.
,
Plaintiff urges that there is not sufficient evidence to support
tht' finding of the board against it; that "improper" evidence
was received by the board; and that competent evidence of-i
.
ft'rt'd by plaintiff was rejected.
[6] Dealing first with the last mentioned contention,
plaintitlclaims that "improper" evidence was admitted before
the board and a transcript of it was submitted to the conrt,
1hllt is, evidence by Santa Anita and Hollywood race tracks
in Los Angeles County, that they would suffer an "economic
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detriment" if another track was authorized in the county;
that it is not the purpose of section 19480.5 under which new,
tracks could be limited, to protect existing tracks from competitio~ or preserve a monopoly for them. It will be noted from
the wording of section 19480.5, however, that no new race',
tracks may be constructed unless it is determined that such:
tracks will be in the public interest and will promote th~
purposes of the horse racing law. Defendants concede, that'
it is not the function of the board to protect existing tracks :
from competition. In its memorandum opinion the trial court ,,1
said: "Nevertheless, eliminating from consideration testimony
concerning the economic interest of the existing tracks, there
is still Substantial evidenM upon which to sustain the Board's
determination. Even if there be some error in the record, the
court should follow the general prin(>jple enunciated in Article VI, section 4Yz of the Constitutioll. to-wit, sustain the~
trial body where the error complained of has not res~ted in~;
a miscarriage of justice." [6] Thus its conclusion was that:
without such evidence there was sufficient evidence to support
the board's decision. Moreover, it is presumed on appe~l
that the co,urt, sitting without a jury, did not base its finding i,'
on irrelevant evidence where there is competenteviden
to support it. (Brock v. Fouchy, 76 Cal.App.2d 363 [172
P.2d 945]; Cordi v. Garcia, 56 Cal.App.2d 584 1132 P.2 '
887].) [7] There being competent evidence to support the!
judgment without such "improper" evidence, and the court ,
not having based its findings on the latter, it is not important'
that plaintiff's offer of proof in rebuttal thereof was denied
by the board.
[8] Furthermore, since the proceeding in the trial court
must be considered as only a hearing where the record before
the board is examined for the purpose of determining the
sufficiency of the evidence, rather than a limited trial de novo
(see McDonough v. Goodcell and discussion supra), then the
applicable rule is, that the admission of irrelevant or incompetent evidence by the board is not ground to annul its action
if there is sufficient competent evidence to support its determination. (See Maryland Casualty Co. v. Ifldustrial Ace.
Com., 178 Cal. 491 [173 P. 993] ; Mesmer (t· Rice v. Industrial
Ace. Com., 178 Oal. 466 [173 P. 1099] ; JJury I..en Mine v.
Industrial Ace. Com., 64 Cal.App.2d ]53 1148 P.2d 106];
Tagg Br08. & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U.S. 420 [50
8.0t. 220, 74 L.Ed. 524].)
[9] There is ample evidence to support the determination
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of the board and trial court. Two witnesses representing
all improvement association testified that the transportation
facilities and traffic conditions would be adversely affected
by a track at Puente, and that added fire protection would
be necessary. A resolution by the California Thoroughbred
Breeders' Association representing 95 per cent of the breeders
of thoroughbred horses in the state was received in evidence.
1t declared that the proposed track would reduce the standard
of the racing and breeding industry in the state and curtail
the revenue to the state. There was also received in evidence
a resolution by the Western Fair Association, comprising 74 !
nonprofit fairs in California, opposing the track, asserting
that it would be injurious to such nonprofit fairs and hence to
agriculture. There is other evidence of a like character in
till' record. There is. however. evidence that the saturation
point for race tracks in Los Angeles County has not been
rrached, but such evidence created nothing more than a con·
flict. [10] The credibility of the witnesses and weight of
the evidence cannot be considered on this appeal. [11] It is
clellr from the wording of section ]9480.5 that the applicant
has the burden of proving. at least, that public interest and
thE' purposes of thellct--would -not . ..be-detrimentally ..affee.tedj:
by the proposed new traek. The.re· is consid.erable diSCU. ssion
by the parties as to whether the applicant must affirmatively
show that the public interest would be benefited or merely
that it would not suffer. but it is not necessary to pass uPo~1
that point. [12] Thus it was for the board to determin~
whether plaintiff's evidence was such that the burden hadl
bren met. This is especially true where most of the evidence
consists of opinions, and the issues involved-public interestl
and purposes of the act-are genE'ral and incapablE' of exac~
definition. Indeed, plaintiff statE'S in its brief: "A moment~
rrflection upon the very nature of the determination that th
hoard was required to make shows that such determinatio
must be predicated, not upon provable concrete facts, bu~
npon opinion evidence exclusively." In such a case, widE.
discretion is necessarily vested in the fact-finder.
[13] Plaintiff argues that the board and trial court faileq
to apply the standard established by section 19480.5, as..~erting
that the words "public interest" used therein related only t~
the purposes to be served by the horse racing law. Be tha·
as it may. the finding of thE' hoard wa.~ in thE' language of th
statute. It reads: "That the applicant has failed to sbo

!
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. that the conducting of horse racing meetings at the proposed
Puente track would be in the public interest and would sub.;
serve the purposes of the California Horse Racing Act and,:
that therefore said application is hereby denied!' Likewise'~
the court's finding was sufficient. There is no basis, therefore, 1
for the assumption that either the board or the trial court
applied the wrong standard or test. On the contrary, the , '
presumption is the other way. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1963(15).) .
[14] Finally, it is urged that the board acted irregularly ,
in reaching its decision in that one of the board members"':
telephoned his vote to a meeting of the board at which the
two other members were present, one of whom dissented.
Assuming that there must have been present at a meeting at I
which the matter was decided by the board, the members neces- ;
Mry to make a decision by a majority of the board, from all
that appears, such was done. The meeting at which only two
members were present was on September 17, 1948. The written decision of the board, dated Septl'mber 21, 1948, recites:/,
"The Matter of the Application of the South em California
Jockey Club, Inc., came on for hearing; evidence was introduced by the applicant and the objectors; the matter was
brie~~ed bY'._~ai~. a.ppJi~!.n.L!&Jl,Q_Q1>jec.tqts_ ~nJ1.l>y the Board
submitted.
"It is now held as follows:
"'That the applicant has 'failed to show that the conducting
of horse racing meetings at the proposed Puente track would
be in the public interest and would subserve the purposes of
the California Horse Racing Act and that therefore said
application is hereby denied." It is signed by two members
of the board, and the third member's dissent was :filed with it.
The judgment is affirmed.

)

Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., and Schauer, J., concurred. Spence,

J., concurred in the judgment.
TRAYNOR, J., Dissenting.-The trial court found that the
determination of the board was supported by "substantial evidence and by the weight of the evidence." The majority opinion herein affirms the decision of the trial court on the ground
that there was substantial evidence to support the determinations of the board and of the trial eourt. It holds that if plaintiff was entitled to a finding by the trial conrt that the board's'
decision was or was not supported by the weight of the evidence, this court discharges its duty to review that decision by

)
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determining whether there was subst.ant.ial evidence to support
it. As an alternative ground for decision it holds that plaintift
was only entitled to a determination by the trial court whether
thcre was substantial evidence to support the decision of the
board, since denial rather than revocation of a license was
im·olved. For the reasons set forth in my dissenting opinion
ill Moran v. Board of Medical Examiners, 32 Ca1.2d 301, 315,
317 [196 P.2d 20J, I cannot agree that if the issue before the
trial court was whether the decision of the board was supported
by the weight of the evidence, our duty of review is discharged
hy discovering substantial evidence to support the trial court.
Manifestly, if we must determine whether the trial court eorrectly decided the issue before it, namely, whether the board's
finding was supported by the weight of the evidence, we cannot do so without reviewing the entire record to see where the
fl'f'?ght of the evidence lies. In affirming the judgment on the
alternate ground the majority opinion abandons the position
prC'viously taken by the majority of tbis court that the findinl!s of fact by state-wide administrative agencies must be
inilC'pendently reexamined by the trial court to determine
whether they are supported by the weight of the evidence.
litln"on v.Board of Medical Examiners, 32 Ca1.2d 301 {196
P.2i1 20] ; Dare v. BoarlJ, of Medical Examiners. 21 Ca1.2d 790
1136 P.2d 3041.)
The majority opinion seeks to explain its abandonment of
the rule of these cases by establishing a distinction between
eaSt'S such as this, in which the action reviewed consists of the
denial of a license or permit, and cases in which the action
tl'vil'wed consists of the revocation or suspension of a previously granted license. Notwithstanding that in either instance
t he result of the administrative action is to deprive the petitioner of the opportunity to carryon a lawful business. profession, or occupation, the mlljority opinion approves the
doctrine of McDonough v. GoodceU, 13 Cal.2d 741, 752-753
{91 P.2d 1035, 123 A.L.R. 1205], that there is a sufficient
practical difference between the two types of action to merit
the application of divergent theories of judicial review. It
is hcld that if the agency revokes a license upon a specific
finding of fact. the action must be reversed by the reviewing
court if the finding is not. supported by the weight of the
evidence, but if on an identical findin~ it merely denies a
lirense or permit, its a('tion may hI' reversed only if ther~ is
no substantial evidence to support it.

)
180 So. CAL. JOCKEY CLUB V. CAL. ETC. RACING BD.

)

[36 C.24-;

in my opinion, the failure to overrule the Dare and Moran ;
eases is not justified by the approval of a double standard for'"
a single problem. It is apparent that there is no practical '
difference between the denial of a license, as in McDonoug1t,.,
v. Goodcell, supra, to a petitioner who has for thirty yeara
conducted the business for which the license is sought, and .
the revocation of a license under which the petitioner may .
have operated his business. It has been aptly stated that" the
majority position has led to an unsound distinction between
suspending a professional license and refusing to grant a.,
licep.se where the result in each instance is to eject a person
from a business in which he has engaged for a number of
years . • . The position taken in the majority opinion can lead
only to further unfortunate complications in this field of the
law." (Djssenting opinion of Gibson, C. J., in Laisne v. Stat.
Board of Optometry, 19 Cal.2d 831, 869 [123 P.2d 457].)
The application of the present decision to the Horse Racing
Act demonstrates the wisdom of that prophecy. "All perS'ons
participating in or having to do with the racing of horses" i
must obtain licenses from the board. (Bus. & Prof. Code, I
§ 19510.) Such licenses are valid only for the calendar year,j
for which they are issued and new licenses must be secux-ed
annually. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 19511.) Licenses may be
refused or revoked only for just cause. (Bus. & Prof. Code,
§ 19513.) Assume that during the calendar year the board - I
after notice and hearing finds that there is just cause for the
revocation of the license of a horse owner, rider, or trainer,
and orders his license revoked. He petitions for writ of mandate and the trial court grants the peremptory writ for the
reason that the board's finding, although supported by substantial evidence, is not supported by the weight of the evidence. Thereafter, petitioner applies at the close of the calendar year for his license, but the board upon the same evidence and upon the same finding upon which its previous
action was predicated, refuses to issue the license. The peremptory writ must now be denied for the reason that the findin/l is supported by substantial evidence. Thus, although the
samp finding is made in each case upon the same evidence
undpr the same statute and "the result in each instance is to
eject a person from a business in which he has engaged for a
number of year," the majority opinion apparently finds no
inconsistency between the types of review that it prescribes.
'fhe present case is thE' first since McDonough v. GoodceU
in which this court hat! approved the doctrine of that ease.

)
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The decisions of the majority of this court have stated the
rule to be that in the ease of a state-wide agency the court
BlUst exercise an independent judgment on the facts and reweigh the evidence in each ease without qualification or limi.
tation to those cases in which only revocation or mspension
of a license is involved. McDonough v. GoodcelZ has occasion·
ally been adhered to by the District Courts of Appeal on the
theory that "whatever our view may be as to the correctness
of this distinction, as an intermediate court we are bound by
this holding of the Supreme Court." (McDonough v. Garn,on, 6.8 Cal,App.2d 318, 337 [156 P.2d 983] [see, also, dissent.
ing 6pinion of Ward, J., at 348-352]; Houmuln v. Boord of
Medical E:taminers, 84 Cal.App.2d 308, 315, 819 [190 P.2d
653]; Glick v. Scudder, 69 Cal.App.2d 717, 719 [160 P.2d 90].)
References to the McDonough case in other decisions were,
as petitioner contends, dicta unnecessary to such decisions.
(Dicrssen v. Oivil 8erv. Oomfll., 43 Cal.App.2d 53, 61 [110
P.2d 513]; Wallace v. Board of EdUCGtion, 63 Cal.App.2d
611, 615 [147 P.2d 8].) In other cases, which in the view
of the majority opinion herein required the application of
McDonough v.GoodceZl, the distinction has been abandoned
in favor of adherence to the logical implications of the rule
of tn:~ Dare and lloran cases. (Tran8porfationBidg;--(Jorp;-v. Daugherty, 74 Cal.App.2d 604, 616 [169 P.2d 470] ; Kleiner
v. Garrison, 82 Cal.App.2d 442,446,447 [187 P.2d 57].)
The doctrine of McDonough v. GoodceU cannot be reconciled
with ~e rationale of the Dare and Moran cases upon which
it is purportedly based. In Standard Oil 00. v. State Board
in announcing its departure from the heretofore prevailing
of Equalization, 6 Cal.2d 557, 559 [59 P.2d 119], this court
rule (see Suckow v. Alderson, 182 Cal. 247 [187 P. 965])
that certiorari will lie to review the decisions of a state-wide
administrative agency stated: "Concisely stated, our conClu·
8ion that we are without authority or jurisdiction to entertain
this proceeding or to issue the writ here sought, is based
Upon the established premises that a writ of certiorari . ••
will lie only to review the exercise of judicial functions (sec.
1068, Code Civ. Proc.) and that the legislature is Without
power . • • to confer judicial functions upon a state-Wide
agency" under article VI, section 1 of the California Constitution. Subsequent cases have expanded the doctrine of the
Standard Oil Company ease into the foUowing syllogism:.
Judicial functions cannot cuwotitutionally be delegated to
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state-wide administrative agencies. The fUD.('tion of making
final findings of fact is judicial, and such finality can be
.accorded only to the findings of fact of a court. (Drummey
v. Rtate Boa·rd of Funeral Directors, 13 CaUd 75, 84-8.5 187
IP .2d 848].)·· Accordingly, the findings of fact of an adminis- .
trative agency must be reviewed by a court that must exercise .
its independent judgment on the facts (Drummey v. Stnte·
Board of Funeral Directors, silpra) and rletermine ·therefrom
whether those findings are supported by the we.ght of the
evidence (Dare v. Board of Medical Examiners. 21 CaJ.2d 790. "
801 [136 P.2d 3041; Moran v. Board of Med7cal Examiner8~
32 Cal.2d 301,308 [196 P.2d 20]). and not merely by substa'lltinl evidence. Presumably, any more limited review would
confer judicial functions upon the administrative agency in :
violation of the constitutional prohibition t h e r e o f . '
Given this reasoning as the basis of the foregoing decisions. ~
it is difficult to justify the distinction established by Me- _
Donottgh v.· Goodcell and the majority opinion herein If),
finality cannot be accorded the findings of fact of an adminis- -.•
trative agency because the function of malting such findings ~
is exclusively judicial, is the function any less judicial be-H:;
cause the petitioner attacking the findings. does not already -'
lhavea liceIll!et ·In8Urance··e~de-;-lJectioil1805, providestJia'
the insurance commissioner may refuse to issue a bail license ::
upon any of .eight specified findings. Section 1807 provides,:
that he may suspend or revoke a bail license for any canse ·1'
for which he could refuse to issue a license. If be were to make
a finding of fact under section 1807, does the California Constitution prohibit this court from ac('ording finality to that:
finding but permit the same finding to be made final under j
st'ction 1805' If there can be no administrative finality under j
the California Constitution, as tbe majority of tbis court i
holds, then the prohibition should apply whetber the Pt'ti- 1
tioner seeks to secure a license or to retain it. If, on the i
other hand, the administrative findings of fact may consti: j
tutionally be made final in license denial cases, they may !
eonstitutionally be made final in license revocation cases.
Manifestly, the doctrine of McDo'llou.gh v. GoodceU is at odds
witb the principles of judicial review announced by the majorlity of this court in the Dare and Moran cases. If the majority
opinion herein is to be consistent with those principles, it
flhould overrule McDonough v. Goodcell. Otherwise, t~_d
Moran, Dare, Laisne, Drummey and Standard Oil Co. cases
must be overruled.
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The fallacy of/N.cDonough v. Goodcell is not its announcement of the rule of administrative finality but its failure to
give that rule its full and proper application. The remedy
for the presently existing inconsistency is not the total repudilit ion of the rule·of administrative finality but the recognition
I111lt "our duty is at an end when it becomes evident that the
Commission's action is based on substant.ial evidence and is
"()Ilsistent with the [statutory] authority." (Securities &I~';r.change Com. v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194,207 (67 S.Ct.
1575, 1760, 91 L.Ed. 1995] ; Republic Aviation Corp. v. Nahflnni Labor R .. Board, 324 U.S. 793, 800 (65 S.Ct. 982, ti9
Jj.Ed. 1372, 157 A.L.R. ]081]; National Broadcasting Co. v.
United States, 319 U.S. 190, 224 [63 s.Ct. 997, 87 L.Ed.
] 344] .) "The construction of a constitutional provision like
I hat in question, given by the California court, is not upheld
hy the weight of authorities and would, if carried to its logi('al l'onclusion, emasculate, if not destroy, the powers of practiC'ally every administrative board or tribunal in [the] state."
(Bolty v. Arizona State Dental Board, 57 Ariz. 239 [112
P.2d 870, 873].) Compelling reasons for the abandonment
of the position taken by the majority of this court have been
f'xpressed in the dissenting opinion in the Laisne ease (19 Cal.
211 at 848-869 >:-and in !pe concurring and dissenting opinion
ill the Dare caSe (21 Cal.2d at 803-816). Further repetition
of these arguments is unnecessary.
It is contended, however, that this court is foreclosed from
the reexamination of its error by virtue of the legislative
adoption of the rule of the Dare and Laisne cases in the
enactment of section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
J can find no such legislative intention in the statute, which
provides merely that "Where it is claimed that the findings
lire not supported by the evidence, in cases in which the court
i.~ authorized by law to exercise its independent judgment on
the evidence, abuse of discretion is established if the court
determines that the findings are not supported by the weight
of the evidence; and in all other cases abuse of discretion is
established if the court determines that the findings are not
supported by substantial evidence in the light of the whole
r~cord."
(Italics added.) The Legislature, however, did
not prescribe the cases in which the court is authorized by
IlIw to exercise its independent judgment on the evidence.
l\llleeo, under the decisions of this court. it could not for the
"cason that the decisions from !Staudard Oil to Dare specifi-
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cally held tb.at the authority exercise an independent
ment is expressly conferred on the court by the California"
Constitution. This court, and' not the Legislature, is the W
arbiter of the meaning of the' 'california Constitution. A' . ':',
. eision by this court that the superior court is not, in ~'i
! such as this, "authorized by law to exercise an independent:,
judgment on the evidence," would be CODSistent with, Dof
contrary to, section 1094.5.
.

Edmonda, J., concurred.
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